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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of Mr. Ramiro Ramirez's first successive

petition for post-conviction relief. The order of summary dismissal should be reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings for three reasons: 1) the district court erred in failing to
appoint counsel; 2) the district court erred in summarily dismissing given no answer or other
indication from the state that it objected to the request for post-conviction relief; and 3) the
district court erred in concluding that Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014),
applied to this case as Mr. Ramirez has never been afforded post-conviction counsel and thus has
never had any meaningful opportunity to have his claims heard.

B.

Procedural History and Statement of Facts
On July 12, 2008, Mr. Ramirez and a co-defendant were found guilty of burglary and

acquitted of aiding and abetting aggravated assault and aiding and abetting attempted robbery.
Mr. Ramirez appealed. R 22.
The State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD) was appointed and two issues were raised
on appeal: 1) whether the court erred in denying a motion for a mistrial; and 2) whether the
sentence imposed was excessive. Relief was denied in an unpublished opinion. State v.
Ramirez, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 44 7. R 22. 1

Mr. Ramirez filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief along with a motion for
appointment of counsel. Mr. Ramirez raised claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

The district court took judicial notice of this opinion and the opinion in the appeal from
the original post-conviction dismissal in this post-conviction case. R 36. Mr. Ramirez has filed
a motion to augment the record in this appeal with those opinions.
1

for failure to raise several issues in direct appeal, including district court error in denying Mr.
Ramirez's motion to suppress the victims' "identifications" of himself and the co-defendant
because of unduly suggestive identification procedures. The district court denied the request for
counsel and summarily dismissed the petition. R 22.
Mr. Ramirez appealed and relief was denied in an unpublished opinion. Ramirez v. State,
2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 401, filed March 3, 2014. R 22.
On May 30, 2014, Mr. Ramirez filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. R 311. He raised this claim:
I assert that the district court erred in allowing the state to elicit testimony of my
co-defendant's refusal to talk to police at the scene of the arrest and I contend that
the error was not harmless. Therefore, counsel ignored issues that are clearly
stronger than those presented in my appeal post-conviction appeal.
RS.

Mr. Ramirez accompanied his petition with an affidavit, R 8-11, setting out the error in
the trial court and requesting the appointment of counsel "to give me an opportunity with counsel
to properly allege the necessary supporting facts for my claim, because I lack the skills and
knowledge to represent myself. Thank you very much." R 11.
Mr. Ramirez also filed a separate motion and affidavit in support for appointment of
counsel. R 12-15.
The state never filed an answer or any other document in the case. R 2.
The court filed a notice of intent to dismiss. R 21-28. In the notice, the court took
judicial notice of the unpublished opinion issued on direct appeal and the unpublished opinion
issued on the appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The court also denied counsel for
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this successive petition writing:
The petitioner's successive petition alleges that the trial court erred in allowing
admission of statements of his co-defendant and that the attorney who handled the
appeal of the dismissal of his original post-conviction relief petition was
ineffective in failing to raise that issue on appeal. The petition is raising for the
first time an issue that could have been presented and was not raised in his
original petition. The petitioner has not presented any sufficient reason as to why
he did not raise this issue in his original petition for post-conviction relief.
Therefore, the court must find the second successive petition to be frivolous and
there is no legal basis for the appointment of counsel. The Motion for
Appointment of Counsel is DENIED.
R25.
With regard to its intent to summarily dismiss the petition, the court first wrote that the
petitioner's claims were untimely because Mr. Ramirez had failed to set forth "sufficient
reasons" as to why his claims had not been raised or were inadequately raised in his initial
petition. R 26.
The court then stated that Mr. Ramirez was alleging ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. The court stated that it would summarily dismiss this claim because 1) there
is no constitutionally protected right to effective assistance of counsel in post-conviction; 2) the
claim of error in allowing testimony at trial regarding the co-defendant's statements "was not
preserved for appeal of the dismissal of his 2012 petition for post-conviction relief. ... An
allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is not a cognizable ground for relief
under the UPCP A."; and 3) "since the petitioner failed to raise the issue of the district court's
error relative to the testimony of the statements of the co-defendant in his original petition, there
was no issue reserved for appeal on the denial of his original petition for post-conviction relief."
R27.
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Mr. Ramirez filed a timely response which he labeled "Motion to Reply Notice oflntent
to Dismiss." R 30-32. In his response, Mr. Ramirez stated:
... I seek modification with my motion to respond. With this motion to respond I
would like to correct allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, of prior postconviction appeal.
The allegations for ineffective assistance of counsel are due to my direct appeal
counsel. I was unclear with the procedures of my second successive petition.
Therefore, I pray the court can disregard the allegations of inffective [sic]
assistance of counsel, of prior post-conviction appeal.
Therefore, the reason for not asserting the grounds in the earlier petition is
because I didn't know of these grounds at the time of first petition. I also lack the
skills and knowledge to represent myself, and with limited access to legal
material. However, I didn't have an attorney to represent me in the proceeding, to
provide a post-conviction application with meaningful opportunity to have my
claims presented, and to help me point out errors.
R 30-31.
Mr. Ramirez closed his response with a second request for counsel "in order to give me
an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary supporting facts. Thank you very
much." R 32.
The district court thereafter issued its memorandum decision and order summarily
dismissing Mr. Ramirez's petition. R 33-40.
The court first stated as a basis for dismissal that from his response, it appeared that Mr.
Ramirez wished to "amend his petition to allege ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel on
his direct appeal and not as to his appellate counsel on his post-conviction appeal." R 34. The
court held that "to the extent that the petitioner seeks to amend his successive petition," the
request was "without merit" and was denied. Citing Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 686-87,
978 P .2d 241, 246-4 7 (Ct. App. 1999), the court noted that to raise additional issues, an amended
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petition must be filed. The court then stated in a footnote that even if it were to consider a claim
of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, the claim would be untimely and forfeited
because it was not raised in the initial petition. R 37.
The court then dismissed Mr. Ramirez's petition writing that Mr. Ramirez was aware of
any error in allowing in identification evidence at the time of the trial and that he was aware of
the issues raised on appeal at the time of appeal. Therefore, the court concluded, "The petitioner
had a meaningful opportunity to assert all claims he wanted to assert in his original petition. A
mere lack of knowledge of the law is not a sufficient reason as to why this claim was not
presented in his original petition." The court cited Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365
(2014), in a footnote in support of its decision. R 39.
While the court noted that it had denied the first request for counsel subject to
reconsideration, the court did not ever specifically deny or acknowledge the second request for
counsel included in the response to the notice of intent to summarily dismiss. R 33.
A final judgment was entered. R 42. This appeal timely follows. R 44-48.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the district court err in failing to appoint counsel?

B. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing in the absence of any answer or
other document filed by the state?
C. Did the district court err in dismissing the successive petition given Mr. Ramirez
never had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims?
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

The District Court Erred in Refusing to Appoint Counsel
Mr. Ramirez requested appointment of counsel twice - once when he filed his petition

and again in his response to the notice of intent to summarily dismiss. The court denied the first
request in its notice of intent to dismiss. In its memorandum decision and order of summary
dismissal, the court recognized its earlier denial of counsel but did not acknowledge or
specifically deny the second request for counsel. The district court's failure to appoint counsel
was, however, error because Mr. Ramirez did set forth facts giving rise to the possibility of a
valid post-conviction claim.
If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay for legal representation, counsel may be

appointed at public expense. I.C. § 19-4904. Although the decision to grant or deny counsel is
discretionary, counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies financially and "alleges facts
to raise the possibility of a valid claim." Juddv. State, 148 Idaho 22, 24,218 P.3d 1, 3 (Ct. App.
2009), quoting Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 794, 102 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2004). See also,

Plantv. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629,632 (Ct. App. 2006).
In assessing whether the possibility of a valid claim has been raised, the district court
must afford leniency to prose petitioners whose petitions may be inartful and incomplete. Plant,
143 Idaho at 761, 152 P.3d at 632.
[T]he trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se
petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to
state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be
alleged because the prose petitioner simply does not know what are the essential
elements of the claim.

Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P .3 d at 1 I 11 .
6

Every inference is to be drawn in favor of the pro se petitioner who cannot be expected to
know how to properly allege the necessary facts. Plant, supra. A prose petitioner need not
allege facts to support every element of a valid claim to obtain counsel; rather, it is sufficient to
have alleged facts supporting some of the elements of a valid claim. Brown v. State, 135 Idaho
676,679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001), superseded in part by statute as stated in Charboneau v. State,
140 Idaho at 792 ftnt. 1, 102 P.3d at 1111, ftnt. 1.
The decision on whether to appoint counsel and the decision of whether to summarily
dismiss a petition are governed by two different standards. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 65455, 152, P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007). In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court considers
only whether there is a possibility of a valid claim, considering circumstances which might
prevent the petitioner from making a more complete investigation into the facts. In a decision of
the merits, the court must consider whether a claim has been made. Id
In this case, Mr. Ramirez alleged error in the admission of testimony regarding his codefendant's refusal to talk to the police. Both the Fifth Amendment as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution guarantee
a criminal defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself. This right also bars
a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's invocation of that right. Grifin v. California,
360 U.S. 609,614 (1965). A prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence for either impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1975), or as substantive
evidence of guilt in the State's case-in-chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284,292
(1986). See also, Stale v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60,253 P.3d 727, 734 (2011). If the evidence
presented regarding the co-defendant's invocation of the constitutional right to remain silent
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could be imputed by the jury to Mr. Ramirez, then presentation of the evidence would have been
improper. And, if this evidence was improperly admitted, there is both a possibility of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel as well as a possibility of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, if the error amounted to fundamental error. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d
961 (2010).
State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4,665 P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1983), is instructive. In Major, the

prosecutor called a witness to the stand who claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege. While the
Court did not find fundamental error given the particular facts of Major's case, the Court noted
that reversible error does occur when the witness is an accomplice of the defendant, this fact was
known to the jury, the prosecutor knew the witness would claim his Fifth Amendment right, and
the prosecutor persisted in asking questions regarding the crime with which the defendant was
charged. The Court cited Robbins v. Small, 371 F.2d 793 (1 st Cir. 1967), cert. denied 386 U.S.
1033, 87 S.Ct. 1483; United States v. King, 461 F.2d 53 (8 th Cir. 1972); Shockley v. State, 335
So.2d 269 (Ala. Cr. App. 1975), ajf'd 335 So.2d 663 (Ala. 1976); People v. Giacalone, 399
Mich. 642, 250 N.W.2d 492 (Mich. 1977).
Moreover, it is clearly erroneous to allow evidence of postarrest silence to be admitted at
trial for the purpose ofraising an inference of guilt. State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344
(1976). Even using the evidence for impeachment purposes is a due process violation. Doyle v.
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245 (1976). See also, State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814,

821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998) (Fifth Amendment rights are applicable pre-arrest and preMiranda2 warnings and evidence of the exercise of the rights may not be admitted to imply

2

Afiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (I 966).
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guilt); State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 290-91, 178 P.3d 644, 655-56 (Ct. App. 2007) (the
defendant's exercise of the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent either before or after arrest
may not be used in the state's case-in-chief for the purpose of inferring guilt.)
In his affidavit in support of his petition, Mr. Ramirez stated that his co-defendant, Mr.
Digiallonardo, declined to speak with the police when their car was stopped by police. Counsel
for Mr. Digiallonardo objected to admission of evidence of Mr. Digiallonardo's exercise of his
Fifth Amendment rights at the joint trial. Even though the court ordered that such testimony not
be admitted, the prosecutor elicited the prohibited testimony from the police officer at trial. R
66-67. Mr. Ramirez stated in his affidavit that the state had conceded that eliciting this
testimony was error. R 66. And, indeed, State v. Digiallonardo, No. 35755, Unpublished Court
of Appeals' Opinion issued November 5, 2010, confirms this allegation. At page 2 of the
opinion, the Court of Appeals states, "The state concedes that allowing the state to elicit
testimony regarding Digiallondardo's pre-Miranda silence was error." The Court went on to
hold that even if the error had not been properly preserved, the error was fundamental error under
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), because there was a reasonable probability

that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Mr. Digiallonardo's conviction from the joint trial
was thus vacated.
Mr. Ramirez paraphrased language from the Court of Appeals' conclusion in its decision
in Digiallonardo (Slip Op. page 4) in his affidavit:
I assert that the nature of the erroneously admitted evidence was especially
damaging in that unlike most erroneous admissions of evidence of a defendant's
silence, it allowed the jury to make two potentially harmful inferences of guilt
based both on my co-defendant's refusal to talk to the officer and also his
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indication as to why he was refusing to talk. 3 This fact, combined with the
relatively inconclusive nature of the evidence linking me and my co-defendant to
the crime, leaves a reasonable possiblity that the erroneously admitted evidence
contributed to the verdict - and thus I conclude it was not harmless error.
R66.
Mr. Ramirez's allegation was sufficient to establish the possibility of a valid claim, both
as to ineffective assistance of his trial counsel in any failure to object to this error and as to his
direct appeal counsel in failing to raise the error on appeal. Therefore, counsel should have been
appointed. Swader, supra.
B.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Petition in the Absence of Any Answer
or Other Pleading or Argument from the State

The state filed nothing in this case - no answer, no motion for summary dismissal, no
briefs.
The purpose of the requirement that the state file an answer within 30 days of the filing of
the petition, LC. § 19-4906, is so that any factual and legal issues before the district court can be
properly framed, thus allowing the district court to make an intelligent ruling on the petition.
Fetterly v. State, 121 Idaho 417,418,825 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1991). "When the state fails to

respond the district court is operating without the benefit of such pleadings and is placed in the
indefensible position of ruling on an application for post-conviction relief without any factual or
legal issues first being framed." Cherniwchan v. State, 99 Idaho 128, 130 n. 2, 578 P.2d 244,
246 n. 2 ( 1978).

According to the Digiallonardo opinion, testimony was elicited that Mr. Digiallonardo
told the officer that he did not want to speak with him because he had overheard a conversation
on the patrol car radio indicating "the event that happened in Jerome and the connection of why
we had stopped him." Slip Op. page 2.
3
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Moreover, a pleading by the state is necessary if the state wishes to controvert any
allegations in the petition. "Until controverted by the state, the allegations are deemed to be
true." Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1987). Uncontroverted
allegations "must be deemed to be true, no matter how incredible they may appear to the trial
court or to this [appellate] Court." Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469,472,491 P.2d 733, 736 (1971),
overruled on other grounds by Kraft v. State, l 00 Idaho 671, 603 P .2d 1005 ( 1979). See also,
Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 272,275, 787 P.2d 258,260 (1990), noting that unrebutted allegations

must be accepted as true.
The difficulty posed by the lack of a state's pleading is compounded when the state also
fails, as it did here, to comply with LC. § 19-4906(a), which provides: "If the application is not
accompanied by the record of the proceedings challenged therein, the respondent shall file with
its answer the record of portions thereof that are material to the questions raised in the
application." The lack of the proper record cannot be attributed to the petitioner and the lack of
a record can require vacation of a grant of summary dismissal. Rodriguez v. State, 122 Idaho 20,
22, 830 P.2d 531, 533 (Ct. App. 1992), superseded on other grounds by statute. See Follinus v.
State, 127 Idaho 897,908 P.2d 590 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, Mr. Ramirez alleged error in the admission of testimony regarding his codefendant's refusal to talk to the police and error in the failure of appellate counsel to raise the
issue as a matter of fundamental error. R 5. In his affidavit, Mr. Ramirez alleged that the state
had conceded error in admission of the testimony. R 8. Mr. Ramirez further alleged, and noted
that the state had not argued differently, that admission of the testimony was fundamental error.
R 9. Mr. Ramirez further alleged that the error was not harmless because the co-defendant's
11

silence could have been viewed by the jury as evidence of a guilty conscience which provided a
critical link in a case against Mr. Ramirez which was entirely circumstantial. Mr. Ramirez
alleged, "I characterize the statements as highly incriminating as they 'implied guilt by informing
the jury that my co-defendant wished to remain silent because he knew he was being investigated
in connection with the incident at Dominos. "' R 8-9. Mr. Ramirez further alleged:
Notably, the women never identified me or my co-defendant as one of the
perpetrators. This is especially apparent given the discrepancies between the
women's descriptions of the perpetrators and their vehicle and the characteristics
of me and my co-defendant, that both of the perpetrators were initially identified
as Hispanic, that clothes worn by the perpetrators were different from those worn
by me and my co-defendant when we were stopped, and that there were various
descriptions of the type of car driven by the perpetrators compared to the Honda
that me and my co-defendant were stopped in. In addition, the weapon and masks
or bandanas alleged used in the incident were never found - either in me or my codefendant's vehicle or along the route that we would have taken from Dominos to
the location where we were stopped by police.
I assert that the nature of the erroneously admitted evidence was especially
damaging in that unlike most erroneous admissions of evidence of a defendant's
silence, it allowed the jury to make two potentially harmful inferences of guilt
based both on my co-defendant's refusal to talk to the officer and also his
indication as to why he was refusing to talk. This fact, combined with the
relatively inconclusive nature of the evidence linking me and my co-defendant to
the crime, leaves a reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence
contributed to the verdict - and thus I conclude it was not harmless error.
R 10.

Given none of these allegations are disputed, the state's concession of error must be taken
as fact. Noel, supra; Smith supra. That leaves only the question of harmlessness. With regard to
that analysis, Mr. Ramirez's allegations that the evidence against him was all weak and
circumstantial, including that neither he nor the car could be linked to the offense by the
witnesses' testimony must likewise be taken as true and agreed to by the state. Id
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This situation is like that presented in Rodriguez v. State, supra. In Rodriguez, based
upon the record presented by the petitioner's allegations, the appellate court was compelled to
vacate the district court's order of dismissal. In Rodriguez, vacation was required because
Rodriguez had alleged that he was not informed of the mandatory minimum sentence and the
state failed to controvert the allegation. Here, Mr. Ramirez has alleged that the state has
conceded error and further that the record supports a finding that the error was not harmless. The
state has not controverted these allegations or provided a record to disprove the allegations and
therefore summary dismissal was inappropriate. Id.
C.

The District Court Erred in Dismissing the Successive Petition Given Mr. Ramirez
Never Had a Meaningful Opportunity to Present His Claims
The district court dismissed Mr. Ramirez's petition on the basis that he failed to establish

a sufficient reason for filing a successive petition. R 38. In particular, the court ruled that Mr.
Ramirez had a meaningful opportunity to present all of his claims in his original petition and
citing Murphy noted that he could not file a successive petition based upon the ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction appellate counsel. The district court's conclusion is flawed
because Mr. Ramirez did not have the constitutionally required meaningful opportunity to
present his claims.
The state does not have to provide any means of collateral review. Nonetheless if the
state does chose, as Idaho has, to allow collateral review, that review must be conducted in
accord with the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. Evitts v. Lucey,
469 U.S. 387,401, 105 S.Ct. 830,839 (1985). "[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates
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of the Constitution-and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause." Id
"'Due process' emphasizes fairness between the State and the individual dealing with the
State." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2443 (1974). "[F]undamental fairness
entitles indigent defendant to 'an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly within the
adversary system."' Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093 (1985)(citation
omitted).
Here, looking to Murphy, the district court held that Mr. Ramirez had enjoyed a
meaningful opportunity to present his claims given he filed an initial petition. However, Murphy
dealt only with a case wherein the petitioner had counsel appointed to assist her in both her initial
and successive petitions. In this case, Mr. Ramirez never had any counsel appointed to assist him
in either his first or successive petition.
As discussed above, Charboneau notes that prose petitioners may fail to state their
claims sufficiently because such claims cannot be sufficiently raised or because the claims are
sufficient but the petitioner lacks the skill and knowledge needed to properly state them. In no
way can it be said that a pro se petitioner has had a meaningful opportunity to present his claims
when he has never been granted counsel to assist in raising the claims in a properly drafted
petition. Murphy does not apply to this case. The application of Murphy to dismiss this petition
is especially egregious given that Mr. Ramirez's co-defendant, tried jointly with him, had his
conviction vacated based upon the error Mr. Ramirez is trying to present as a prose litigant.
This is not a case wherein there is no valid claim at issue. Mr. Ramirez's allegations were
sufficient to establish a reason under I.C. § 19-4908 to allow a successive petition. Given the
failure to ever appoint counsel, dismissal of Mr. Ramirez's successive petition is in contravention
14

of the requirements of fundamental fairness and due process.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Ramirez asks that this Court reverse the order of
summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

t!

Respectfully submitted this,,_3,_. day of February, 2015.

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Ramiro Ram rez
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